MilliSonic: Pushing the Limits of Acoustic Motion Tracking

Recent years have seen interest in device tracking and localization using acoustic signals. State-of-the-art acoustic motion tracking systems however do not achieve millimeter accuracy and require large separation between microphones and speakers, and as a result, do not meet the requirements for many VR/AR applications. Further, tracking multiple concurrent acoustic transmissions from VR devices today requires sacrificing accuracy or frame rate. We present MilliSonic, a novel system that pushes the limits of acoustic based motion tracking. Our core contribution is a novel localization algorithm that can provably achieve sub-millimeter 1D tracking accuracy in the presence of multipath, while using only a single beacon with a small 4-microphone array.Further, MilliSonic enables concurrent tracking of up to four smartphones without reducing frame rate or accuracy. Our evaluation shows that MilliSonic achieves 0.7mm median 1D accuracy and a 2.6mm median 3D accuracy for smartphones, which is 5x more accurate than state-of-the-art systems. MilliSonic enables two previously infeasible interaction applications: a) 3D tracking of VR headsets using the smartphone as a beacon and b) fine-grained 3D tracking for the Google Cardboard VR system using a small microphone array

Physical Layer Wireless Security Made Fast and Channel Independent

There is a growing interest in physical layer security. Recent work has demonstrated that wireless devices can generate a shared secret key by exploiting variations in their channel. The rate at which the secret bits are generated, however, depends heavily on how fast the channel changes. As a result, existing schemes have a low secrecy rate and are mainly applicable to mobile environments. In contrast, this paper presents a new physical-layer approach to secret key generation that is both fast and independent of channel variations. Our approach makes a receiver jam the signal in a manner that still allows it to decode the data, yet prevents other nodes from decoding. Results from a testbed implementation show that our method is significantly faster and more accurate than state of the art physical-layer secret key generation protocols. Specifically, while past work generates up to 44 secret bits/s with a 4% bit disagreement between the two devices, our design has a secrecy rate of 3-18 Kb/s with 0% bit disagreement

ZigZag Decoding: Combating Hidden Terminals in Wireless Networks

This paper presents ZigZag, an 802.11 receiver that combats hidden terminals. ZigZag exploits 802.11 retransmissions which, in the case of hidden terminals, cause successive collisions. Due to asynchrony, these collisions have different interference-free stretches at their start, which ZigZag uses to bootstrap its decoding. ZigZag makes no changes to the 802.11 MAC and introduces no overhead when there are no collisions. But, when senders collide, ZigZag attains the same throughput as if the colliding packets were a priori scheduled in separate time slots. We build a prototype of ZigZag in GNU Radio. In a testbed of 14 USRP nodes, ZigZag reduces the average packet loss rate at hidden terminals from 82.3% to about 0.7%

iJam: Jamming Oneself for Secure Wireless Communication

Wireless is inherently less secure than wired networks because of its broadcast nature. Attacks that simply snoop on the wireless medium successfully defeat the security of even 802.11 networks using the most recent security standards (WPA2-PSK). In this paper we ask the following question: Can we prevent this kind of eavesdropping from happening? If so, we can potentially defeat the entire class of attacks that rely on snooping. This paper presents iJam, a PHY-layer protocol for OFDM-based wireless systems. iJam ensures that an eavesdropper cannot successfully demodulate a wireless signal not intended for it. To achieve this iJam strategically introduces interference that prevents an eavesdropper from decoding the data, while allowing the intended receiver to decode it. iJam exploits the properties of 802.11â s OFDM signals to ensure that an eavesdropper cannot even tell which parts of the signal are jammed. We implement iJam and evaluate it in a testbed of GNURadios with an 802.11-like physical layer. We show that iJam makes the data bits at the adversary look random, i.e., the BER becomes close to 50%, whereas the receiver can perfectly decode the data

Zig Zag decoding : combating hidden terminals in wireless networks

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2008.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 59-62).This thesis presents ZigZag, an 802.11 receiver that combats hidden terminals. ZigZag exploits 802.11 retransmissions which, in the case of hidden terminals, cause successive collisions. Due to asynchrony, these collisions have different interference-free stretches at their start, which ZigZag uses to bootstrap its decoding. ZigZag makes no changes to the 802.11 MAC and introduces no overhead when there are no collisions. But, when senders collide, ZigZag attains the same throughput as if the colliding packets were a priori scheduled in separate time slots. We build a prototype of ZigZag in GNU Radio. In a testbed of 14 USRP nodes, ZigZag reduces the average packet loss rate at hidden terminals from 82.3% to about 0.7%.by Shyamnath GollakotaS.M

Embracing interference in wireless systems

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, February 2013."February 2013." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-183).The wireless medium is a shared resource. If nearby devices transmit at the same time, their signals interfere, resulting in a collision. In traditional networks, collisions cause the loss of the transmitted information. For this reason, wireless networks have been designed with the assumption that interference is intrinsically harmful and must be avoided. This dissertation takes an alternate approach: Instead of viewing interference as an inherently counterproductive phenomenon that should to be avoided, we design practical systems that transform interference into a harmless, and even a beneficial phenomenon. To achieve this goal, we consider how wireless signals interact when they interfere, and use this understanding in our system designs. Specifically, when interference occurs, the signals get mixed on the wireless medium. By understanding the parameters of this mixing, we can invert the mixing and decode the interfered packets; thus, making interference harmless. Furthermore, we can control this mixing process to create strategic interference that allow decodability at a particular receiver of interest, but prevent decodability at unintended receivers and adversaries. Hence, we can transform interference into a beneficial phenomenon that provides security. Building on this approach, we make four main contributions: We present the first WiFi receiver that can successfully reconstruct the transmitted information in the presence of packet collisions. Next, we introduce a WiFi receiver design that can decode in the presence of high-power cross-technology interference from devices like baby monitors, cordless phones, microwave ovens, or even unknown technologies. We then show how we can harness interference to improve security. In particular, we develop the first system that secures an insecure medical implant without any modification to the implant itself. Finally, we present a solution that establishes secure connections between any two WiFi devices, without having users enter passwords or use pre-shared secret keys.by Shyamnath Gollakota.Ph.D

Underwater 3D positioning on smart devices

The emergence of water-proof mobile and wearable devices (e.g., Garmin Descent and Apple Watch Ultra) designed for underwater activities like professional scuba diving, opens up opportunities for underwater networking and localization capabilities on these devices. Here, we present the first underwater acoustic positioning system for smart devices. Unlike conventional systems that use floating buoys as anchors at known locations, we design a system where a dive leader can compute the relative positions of all other divers, without any external infrastructure. Our intuition is that in a well-connected network of devices, if we compute the pairwise distances, we can determine the shape of the network topology. By incorporating orientation information about a single diver who is in the visual range of the leader device, we can then estimate the positions of all the remaining divers, even if they are not within sight. We address various practical problems including detecting erroneous distance estimates, addressing rotational and flipping ambiguities as well as designing a distributed timestamp protocol that scales linearly with the number of devices. Our evaluations show that our distributed system running on underwater deployments of 4-5 commodity smart devices can perform pairwise ranging and localization with median errors of 0.5-0.9 m and 0.9-1.6